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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Annotated 
section 78-2a-3(2)(k) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND RECORD 
CITATION SHOWING ISSUE PRESERVATION 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b), CTX adopts most of Rukavina's 
statement of the issues, standard of review, and cites to the record on issue preservation, and only 
recites those issues with which CTX is dissatisfied 
1. Did the trial court error in granting CTX's Motion to Enforce the Settlement 
Agreement? 
CTX agrees with Rukavina's statement of this issue, but disagrees with Rukavina's contention 
that the proper standard of review is correctness Normally, "a trial court's summary enforcement 
of a settlement agreement 'will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an abuse 
of discretion "' John Deere Co v A & H Equipment. Inc. 876 P 2d 880, 883 (Utah App 
1994)(quoting Zions First NatM Bank v Barbara Jensen Interiors. Inc. 781 P 2d 478, 479 (Utah App 
1989)) See also Mascaro v Davis. 741 P 2d 938. 942 n 11 (Utah 1987) The only exception to this 
general rule is situations in which the trial court did not rely on extrinsic evidence in making its ruling 
Then, a correctness standard applies Sacklerv Savin. 897 P 2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995) At best, 
this issue is a mixed question of law and fact 
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2. In response to Rukavina's sixth issue, CTX believes a more understandable and 
appropriate recitation of the issue is did the trial court act correctly when it struck Rukavina's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Specific Enforcement of Settlement Agreement? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. 16-10a-1502. Consequences of 
transacting business without authority. 
(1) A foreign corporation transacting business in this state without authority, or 
anyone in its behalf, may not maintain a proceeding in any court in this state until an application for 
authority to transact business is filed with the division 
(2) A court may stay a proceeding commenced by a foreign corporation, its successor, 
or assignee until it determines whether the foreign corporation, its successor, or assignee is required 
to file an application for authority to transact business. If it so determines, the court may further stay 
the proceeding until the required application for authority to transact business has been filed by the 
division. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b). Process. 
(b) Time of Service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons 
together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 days after the filing of the 
complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause shown If the summons and 
complaint are not timely served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any 
party or upon the court's own initiative In an action brought against two or more defendants on 
which service is obtained upon one of them within the 120 days or such longer period as may be 
allowed by the court, the other or others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(e). Omitted Counterclaim. 
(e) When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or 
excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by 
amendment. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Amendments. 
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after 
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it is served Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent 
of the adverse party, and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Proceedings 
On November 13, 1992, CTX Properties, Inc, ("CTX") filed a complaint against Andy 
Rukavina ("Rukavina") for eviction and unlawful detainer of CTX's rented premises located at 5646 
Magic Isle Lane, Murray, Utah ("the Property") (Record 1-15) On December 2, 1992, Rukavina 
filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint alleging that the lease agreement which 
Rukavina and CTX signed contained an option to purchase the Property that Rukavina exercised and 
that CTX owed him $20,000 00 for improvements to the Property (R 19-27) Rukavina also filed 
a Third-Party Complaint against Michael Wright as principal of CTX and Eloise Barney, a CTX 
employee, to exercise the option or to recover costs of improvements made to the Property 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On January 28, 1993, CTX filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), stating that the option provision in the lease was unenforceable 
because it did not include definite terms for the Property's purchase (R 35-37) Rukavina filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and submitted affidavits 
from Rukavina and Barney on February 10, 1993 (R 38-69, 77-85) On February 24, 1993, CTX 
filed a Motion to Strike Reference to Settlement and Evidence Extrinsic to the Pleadings seeking to 
bar use of the Barney and Rukavina affidavits and other extrinsic evidence in Rukavina's pleadings 
(R 86-88) The trial court granted CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to 
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Strike Reference to Settlement and Evidence Extrinsic to the Pleadings Order Granting Plaintiffs 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Motion to Strike and Restitution of Premises, April 20, 1993 
(R 121-124). A Judgment and Writ of Restitution was entered by the court that same day (R. 125). 
On July 1, 1994, Rukavina filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Dismiss Plaintiffs 
Complaint. The motion was based on the fact that CTX was an unregistered foreign corporation and, 
under Utah Code Annotated section 16-10a-1502(1), had no standing to sue in a Utah court. (R. 
237-238). Over CTX's objection, the trial court issued an Order Vacating Judgment on November 
28, 1994. (R. 304-305). On November 17, 1994, CTX filed a Motion to Reinstate Judgment and 
For Judgment on the Pleadings. (R. 290-291). CTX filed its motion after the trial court had issued 
a ruling from the bench but before the written order was signed The trial court granted CTX's 
Motion to Reinstate the Judgment on February 27, 1995. (R. 547-551) 
On December 9, 1994, Rukavina filed a Motion for Leave to Amend his Answer, 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. (R. 310-331). On that same day, he also filed a motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment for Specific Enforcement of Settlement Agreement, relating to an 
alleged settlement reached in another case involving CTX and Eloise Barney (R 306-309). The 
motion was based on claims contained in the proposed amended answer. Additionally, Rukavina 
simultaneously filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Enforce the Option Agreement. (R. 
332-335). That Motion is not at issue on appeal. On January 13, 1995, CTX filed a motion in 
opposition to Rukavina's Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and a Motion to Strike Defendant's 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. CTX noted that the motions for summary judgment were 
inappropriate because they were based on causes of action contained in the proposed amended 
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answer that was not yet before the trial court (R 403-422) In its February 27, 1995, Order, the 
trial court denied Rukavina's Motion for Leave to Amend Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint and Rukavina's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
(R 547-551) 
At approximately the same time, CTX filed a Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction because none of the third-party defendants were served with the complaint within 
120 days (R 471-473) Rukavina objected to the motion (R 541-544) On April 3, 1995, the trial 
court granted CTX's Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint by minute entry (R 709) 
CTX filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and for Entry of Judgment on April 
10, 1995 (R 711-713) The motion was based on a settlement of the case reached during 
negotiations in March, 1995 See Second Revised Order and Judgment, dated September 20, 1995 
(R 897-900) Rukavina objected to the motion, but the trial court granted it on September 20, 1995 
(R 897-900) The September 20, 1995 Order effectively disposed of the case The parties filed a 
stipulated motion for dismissal on October 24, 1995 (R 904-906) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At all times relevant to this appeal, CTX was the owner of residential property located 
at 5646 Magic Isle Lane, Murray, Utah ("the Property") l CTX, through its agent Eloise Barney, 
rented the premises to Rukavina under a lease dated July 1, 1987 Complaint at paragraph 1 (R 1) 
The lease expired by its own terms on July 1, 1992 Lease, Addendum A to Appellee's Brief 
*CTX sold the Property to a third party after it obtained possession from Rukavina 
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2. The lease contains an option provision that provides 
At the time of the expiration of said lease, 20% of lease payments shall either 
be credited towards the down payment or towards the purchase price of the 
above referenced home. Each agent shall obtain a separate appraisal and at that 
time a fair sales price shall be determined. 
Lease at paragraph 15, Addendum A to Appellee's Brief. 
3. Rukavina occupied the Property throughout the term of the lease, and on a month-to-
month basis after the lease expired on July 1, 1992 During 1992, the parties entered into discussions 
concerning Rukavina's purchase of the Property under the option provision Both CTX and 
Rukavina obtained appraisals of the Property, but because of the lack of detail in the lease provision, 
the parties were not able to reach an agreement on sale and financing details for the Property Letter 
from Paul T. Moxley, counsel for CTX, to L. Benson Mabey, counsel for Rukavina, dated February 
27, 1992; Letters from Paul T Moxley to Dennis Mangrum, counsel for Rukavina, dated July 9 and 
September 2, 1992 (R 62, 207-208, 211) Although Rukavina claims he exercised the option, the 
record contains no indication that Rukavina actually ever tendered money for the purchase of the 
Property or accepted CTX's terms for financing the Property 
4 On October 16, 1992, CTX properly served Rukavina with a Notice to Quit pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann section 78-36-3 demanding that Rukavina vacate the Property no later than October 
31, 1992. Rukavina did not vacate the premises by that date, prompting CTX to bring this action for 
unlawful detainer on November 13, 1992 Complaint at paragraphs 3-6 (R 2-3) 
5. On December 2, 1992, Rukavina filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint alleging that the lease agreement that Rukavina and CTX signed contained an option to 
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purchase the Property that Rukavina exercised and that CTX owed him $20,000 00 for improvements 
to the Property (R 19-27) Rukavina also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Michael Wright 
as principal of CTX and Eloise Barney, a CTX employee, to exercise the option or to recover costs 
of improvements made to the Property 
6. The Third-Party Complaint was not served on the third-party defendants until over two 
years later, when Barney accepted service of process on January 18, 1995 (R 423-424) 
7 On January 28, 1993, CTX filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), stating that the option provision in the lease was unenforceable 
because it did not include definite terms for the Property's purchase (R 35-37) Rukavina filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and submitted affidavits 
from Rukavina and Barney on February 10, 1993 (R 38-85) On February 24, 1993, CTX filed 
a Motion to Strike Reference to Settlement and Evidence Extrinsic to the Pleadings seeking to bar 
use of the Barney and Rukavina affidavits and other extrinsic evidence in Rukavina's pleadings (R 
86-88) The trial court granted CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Strike 
Reference to Settlement and Evidence Extrinsic to the Pleadings Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings, Motion to Strike and Restitution of Premises, April 20, 1993 (R 121-
124) A Judgment and Writ of Restitution was entered by the court that same day (R 125-127) 
8 On July 1, 1994, Rukavina filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Dismiss Plaintiffs 
Complaint The motion was based on the fact that CTX was an unregistered foreign corporation and, 
under Utah Code Annotated section 16-10a-1502(1), had no standing to sue in a Utah court (R 
237-243) Over CTX's objection, the trial court issued an Order Vacating Judgment on November 
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28, 1994 (R 304-305) On November 17, 1994, CTX filed a Motion to Reinstate Judgment and 
For Judgment on the Pleadings (R 290-291) CTX filed its motion after the trial court had issued 
a ruling from the bench but before the written order was signed The trial court granted CTX's 
Motion to Reinstate the Judgment on February 27, 1995 (R 547-551) 
9 On December 9, 1994, Rukavina filed a Motion for Leave to Amend his Answer, 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (R 310-331) On that same day, he also filed a motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment for Specific Enforcement of Settlement Agreement, relating to an 
alleged settlement reached in another case involving CTX and Eloise Barney (R 306-309) 
Additionally, Rukavina simultaneously filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Enforce the 
Option Agreement (R 332-335) That Motion is not at issue on appeal 
10 On January 13, 1995, CTX filed a motion in opposition to Rukavina's Motion for Leave 
to Amend Answer and a Motion to Strike Defendant's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment CTX 
noted that the motions for summary judgment were inappropriate because they were based on causes 
of action contained in the proposed amended answer that was not yet before the trial court (R 403-
422) In its February 27, 1995, Order, the trial court denied Rukavina's Motion for Leave to Amend 
Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and Rukavina's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment to Enforce Settlement Agreement (R 547-551) 
11. CTX then filed a Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint for lack of jurisdiction 
because none of the third-party defendants were served with the complaint within 120 days (R 471-
473) Rukavina objected to the motion (R 541-544) On April 3, 1995, the trial court granted 
CTX's Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint by minute entry (R 709) 
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12 CTX filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and for Entry of Judgment on 
April 10, 1995 (R 711-733) The motion was based on a settlement of the case reached during 
negotiations in March, 1995 See Second Revised Order and Judgment, dated September 20, 1995 
(R. 897-900). The terms of the settlement agreement are contained in two letters exchanged by 
counsel The first letter, from CTX's counsel to Rukavina's counsel, is dated March 14, 1995, the 
second letter, from Rukavina's counsel to CTX's counsel, is dated March 16, 1995 Exhibits A & 
B to Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement. (R 720-724 ) Rukavina objected to the motion, but the trial court granted it on 
September 20, 1995. (R 720-724) The September 20, 1995, Order disposing of the case dismissed 
all causes of action set forth by CTX in its complaint and granted judgment to Rukavina in the 
amount of $2,500 00 (R 720-724) The parties filed a stipulated motion for dismissal on October 
24, 1995 (R 904-906) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court acted appropriately when it enforced the settlement agreement entered into by 
the parties in their letters dated March 14 and 16, 1995 The agreement was clear and unambiguous, 
and Rukavina's excuse for nonperformance under the agreement is unsubstantial The trial court did 
not err when it determined that CTX could waive its right to a global settlement of all the cases 
pending between CTX and Rukavina and his relatives CTX was the one seeking a global settlement, 
and it therefore had the right to waive that demand 
Similarly, the trial court was correct in ruling that the option provision in the lease was 
unambiguous and unenforceable The option provision did not include a manner for determining the 
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purchase price of the Property The amount was to be determined in the future, and option contracts 
with terms performable in the future are unenforceable The alleged option contract was nothing 
more than an agreement to agree 
The trial court did not err when it denied Rukavina's attempt to introduce extrinsic evidence 
to vary the terms of the option provision The provision is clear and unambiguous on its face and 
needs no extrinsic evidence to explain its terms. An option agreement can be both unenforceable and 
unambiguous, and that is the case here. Furthermore, the option provision was part of an integrated 
contract as evidenced by the integration clause contained in the lease provision Extrinsic evidence 
cannot be introduced to vary the terms of an integrated contract 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Rukavina's motion to amend his 
Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. The proposed amended answer was filed more 
than two years after the original answer, late in the course of the proceedings, and only three months 
before the scheduled trial date No explanation was given for the delay and CTX would have been 
prejudiced if the proposed amended answer had been filed at that late date 
Rukavina's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Enforce Settlement Agreement was not 
improperly stricken by the trial court The motion was based on claims contained only in Rukavina's 
proposed amended answer, which was never before the trial court 
The trial court's ruling reinstating the April 20, 1993, judgment was proper The trial court 
correctly followed the directive of Utah Code Annotated section 16-10a-1502(3) in reinstating the 
judgment. 
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Finally, the trial court correctly dismissed (without prejudice) the Third-Party Complaint filed 
against Barney and Wright for failure to comply with Utah R Civ P 4(b) Barney was not served 
with a summons and the complaint for over two years, well beyond the 120 day limit in Rule 4(b) 
The trial court's rulings were correct in every regard, and Rukavina's myriad objections to 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT ENFORCED THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN CTX AND RUKAVINA. 
A. Correct Standard of Review. 
Rukavina claims that the trial court's decision to enforce the settlement agreement should be 
reviewed for correctness. A correctness standard is not appropriate here Normally, "a trial court's 
summary enforcement of a settlement agreement 'will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown 
that there was an abuse of discretion.'" John Deere Co. v. A. & H Equipment Co, 876 P.2d 880, 
883 (Utah App. 1994)(quoting Zions First Nat'l Bank v Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc . 781 P 2d 478, 
479 (Utah App. 1989)). See also Mascaro v. Davis. 741 P.2d 938, 942 n. 11 (Utah 1987). The only 
exception to this general rule is situations in which the trial court did not rely on extrinsic evidence 
in making its ruling. Then, a correctness standard applies. Sackler v Savin, 897 P 2d 1217, 1220 
(Utah 1995) Here, the trial court based its decision to enforce the settlement agreement on 
correspondence, the proposed agreement itself, and outside evidence such as contradictory affidavits 
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filed by the parties The trial court necessary determined that CTX's version of the events 
surrounding the settlement agreement was more credible Therefore, an abuse of discretion standard 
should be applied 2 
B. The Trial Court's Enforcement of the Settlement Agreement was Not Error. 
It is well established that "[settlement agreements are favored by law and may be summarily 
enforced " Sadder. 897 P 2d at 1220)(citing Zions First Nat'l Bank. 781 P 2d at 479)) See also 
Mascaro. 741 P 2d at 942, John Deere. 876 P 2d at 883, Goodmansen v Liberty Vending Systems. 
866 P 2d 581, 584 (Utah App 1993) A court must enforce a settlement agreement if it is binding 
"and the excuse for nonperformance is comparatively insubstantial " Sadder, 897 P 2d at 1220 
(citing Zions Nat'l Bank. 781 P 2d at 479) Accord John Deere. 876 P 2d at 884 
The terms of the settlement agreement are contained in two letters exchanged by counsel 
The first letter, from CTX's Counsel to Rukavina's counsel, is dated March 14, 1995, the second 
letter, from Rukavina's counsel to CTX's counsel, is dated March 16, 1995 Exhibits A & B to 
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement (R 720-724) Rukavina claims that there was no meeting of the minds as to the terms 
of the agreement to resolve all four of the related cases then pending In support of this claim, he 
refers to one related case, CTX Properties. Inc v Anthony Duran. Civil No 930904765, then 
pending before Judge Bohling Part of the settlement agreement memorialized in the March 14 and 
2In John Deere, the court discusses both the abuse of discretion and correctness standard John 
Deere, 876 P 2d at 883 The court then proceeded to apply the abuse of discretion standard when 
it upheld the trial court's decision to enforce a settlement agreement Id at 884 
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16, 1995 letters was that Duran could purchase his home from CTX with the price to be determined 
by averaging appraisals submitted by each side. Rukavina asserts that the settlement negotiations 
broke down because CTX would not let Duran utilize a two-year old appraisal He asserts that he 
would not sign the settlement agreements prepared by CTX because of this issue 
In its September 20, 1995 Order dismissing the case, the trial court stated that the agreement 
was clear and unambiguous and that a meeting of the minds existed as to all material terms involved 
in the settlement. It then enforced the terms of the agreement reached by the parties as evidenced in 
the letters dated March 14 and 16, 1995 (R. 897-900) The trial court's ruling is appropriate from 
both a factual and legal standpoint. 
The trial court reviewed affidavits filed by the parties in which the issue of the outdated 
appraisal was discussed. Affidavit of Robert Mansfield, Exhibit D to Plaintiffs Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement ("First Mansfield 
Affidavit")(R 731-33), Affidavit of Robert Mansfield, Exhibit A to Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement ("Second Mansfield Affidavit")(R 856-858), Affidavit 
of Budge Call, Exhibit A to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Enforce 
Settlement. (R. 824-827). CTX's affidavits state that the issue of the old appraisal did not arise until 
after the settlement was already entered, Vvhen CTX was attempting to have Rukavina sign the 
settlement agreement papers. (First Mansfield Affidavit at paragraphs 4-10, Second Mansfield 
Affidavit at paragraphs 7-12). CTX also claims that Rukavina knew that use of the outdated 
appraisal was not a part of the previously entered settlement agreement and was only requesting its 
use to spare him the cost of obtaining a new appraisal. (Second Mansfield Affidavit at paragraphs 
13 
10-11) In his affidavit, counsel for Rukavina claims that the issue of obtaining a new appraisal was 
never discussed, and that it was Rukavina's understanding that the old appraisal could be used (Call 
Affidavit at paragraphs 5-6) 
By ruling that there was a meeting of the minds based on the letters exchanged by the parties, 
the trial court implicitly rejected Rukavina's contention that use of the old appraisal was part of the 
deal This factual finding should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion 
The trial court's decision is also supported by the applicable law The court necessarily 
determined that Rukavina's excuse for nonperformance, that an outdated appraisal should have been 
used on the Duran home, was "comparatively insubstantial" and therefore did not bar enforcement 
of the settlement agreement See Sadder, 897 P 2d at 1220, John Deere. 876 P 2d at 884 It is well 
established that "unexpressed intentions do not affect the validity of a contract " Jaramillo v Farmers 
Ins Group. 669 P 2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 1983) Moreover, "4[p]arties have no right to welch on a 
settlement during the sometimes substantial period between when the deal is struck and when all 
necessary signatures can be garnered on a stipulation '" Goodmansen. 866 P 2d 585 (quoting Brown 
v Browa 744 P 2d 333, 336 (Utah App 1987)(Orme, J , dissenting)) Rukavina tried to welch on 
the deal memorialized in the letters by injecting his unexpressed intention to use an old, undervalued 
appraisal Under either an abuse of discretion or correctness standard, the trial court's decision 
rejecting that attempt is appropriate 
Finally, Rukavina attempts to attribute some significance to the fact that the actual settlement 
papers were never executed However, where an actual meeting of the minds is established, "it is of 
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no legal consequence that the parties have not signed a settlement agreement " Goodmansen. 866 
P 2d at 585 
C. The Trial Court's Determination that CTX Could Waive its Right to A Global 
Settlement Was Not Error. 
Rukavina claims that the trial court erred by enforcing the settlement in this case when the 
other cases that were a part of the global settlement were not settled on the terms discussed 
Rukavina also believes it was improper for CTX to proceed on other motions in this case while it was 
seeking to enforce the settlement agreement 
As evidenced in the March 14, 1995 letter, CTX was the one that required all the cases to be 
settled at once In its September 20, 1995, Order, the trial court determined that CTX had waived 
its requirement for a global settlement of all the cases involving Rukavina and his relatives (R 897-
900) That determination was not error 
A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right Rees v Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc, 808 P 2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1991) Whether a party has waived a right is a factual 
question for which considerable deference is accorded to the trial court's factual determinations 
Olympus Hills Center, Ltd v Smith's Foods. 889 P 2d 445, 461 (Utah App 1994) A party may 
waive performance of any provision of a contract that is intended for its benefit South Lake Center 
v Waker Associates, 879 P 2d 1342, 1347 (Or App 1994), Pruitt v Pavelin, 685 P 2d 1347, 1356 
(Ariz App 1984) 
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Here, the right to enforce all of the settlements globally belonged to CTX, the benefit of that 
right inured solely to it3 Thus, CTX could, and did, intentionally waive enforcement of the right in 
order to have this case settled Moreover, the fact that other aspects of the settlement agreement 
broke down before they could be enforced is not relevant to this lawsuit Although the various cases 
between CTX and Rukavina and his relatives were all included in the global agreement, the settlement 
agreement presented to the trial court for enforcement here related to the issues in this case alone 
After determining that a valid agreement was forged in the letters, the trial court reasonably enforced 
the agreement before it. 
CTX's pursuit of its motion to compel and motion to dismiss the third-party complaint while 
trying to get Rukavina to sign the settlement documents was proper CTX filed its Motion to Dismiss 
the Third-Party Complaint on February 9, 1995 It filed its Renewed Motion to Compel on February 
17, 1995 (R 471-473, 502-504) Thus, both motions were already pending when the parties 
entered into the settlement agreement in mid-March, 1995 At that time, the March 28, 1995, trial 
date was rapidly approaching and CTX needed to make sure it was prepared to proceed CTX should 
not have to sit back and wait for Rukavina to sign the settlement documents when it was becoming 
clear that Rukavina was trying to welch on the agreement reached in the letters There was no error 
on the part of CTX in pursuing the motions and settlement simultaneously 
3
 In his brief, Rukavina claims that he wanted to settle the case involving Duran's home in a global 
settlement because Rukavina's mother was living in the home Rukavina does not demonstrate that 
he ever preserved this issue for appeal by raising it before the trial court See Ong Int'l v 11th Ave 
Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993)(issues not raised below are waived on appeal) Further, that 
case did settle, Duran purchased the home, and Rukavina's mother is residing there 
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I .- -: .: -. l- oui t believes that the ti ial coui t incorrectly enforced the settlement 
agreement, it can still ailirm flu* trial court's ruling granting judgment on the pleadings to CTX. 
I'll 
THE T R I M COURT WAS CORRECT IN R! JUNG I l IAT THE OPTION 
PROVISION WAS UNENFORCEABLE AND THAT RI IK AVINA'S EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE SHOUI D BE B \RRED 
Rukavina claims that the trial court erred by determining that the opti *n pun iMnr. WA^ < I) 
unambiguous and i'2x- unenforceable because ;* dir^  r^t contain a sufficiently definite metl lod for 
:
~ •• " • ' ul auiKi ,bi id* i HI in 1 Ins point is somewhat 
rr\niv tie appears to ne aruuirm that ihc « - r • *oi;:f ^h;»uid not I lave ruled against him as a n latter of 
law f^ Lciusc tin *-ptu\ /.* . .-; .• ,t •• A:. • - ;= : • >i 
sectiuii, RuKdviiia alsu Uidiiohgo tiic iiiai couit o dc^iMon oin*- MI*1 cMnn^c c\ ideik'e \K- tiltcmptcci 
to introduce concerning the alleged purchase price of the Rukavina home, although he provides no 
; r.t :UA . oir: • decision on this point was based on I Jtal i Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), 
..;.;.. v ;'.-e same standi, ;
 t- a ^L h>h<ppd_.J *_ 
Berman, IS 1- iu i 4 , , . ^ ' , • ,< Tn 1994); Craigs, Inc. v. General Electric Capital Corp !: I ui 
686, 688 (7th Cir. 1994)(referring to Federal Rules of Ci\ il I »i ( >cedure 12(c) ai id 12(b)! r 
. ;,- .
 ; :v,r. (. ; -spears that Rukavina can present no facts in support of 
his cia:m thai ^.-^ • • • K* ichc: !leiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons. Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109 
(I Iti ill i i\ »[ ). 1990). 
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A. The Trial Court's Ruling That the Option Provision Was Unambiguous and 
Unenforceable Was Not Error. 
In its Order granting CTX's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court determined 
that the option provision in the lease was unenforcable as a matter of law, and was unambiguous 
(R 121-124) The court's ruling regarding enforceability was based on the fact that the option 
provision did not contain a purchase price or a method for determining a purchase price for the 
Property The court reasoned that the provision constituted merely an agreement to agree in the 
future, which is unenforceable (R 121-124) The court further determined that although the 
agreement lacked an essential term, it was not ambiguous The provision simply did not rise to the 
level of a binding contract This ruling is correct as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err by 
refusing to go beyond the pleadings in resolving the issue 
An "option contract for real property requires one offer and acceptance of the exclusive right 
to purchase the property and another offer and acceptance for the actual transfer of the property " 
Property Assistance Corp v Roberts. 768 P 2d 976, 978 (Utah App 1989) The necessity for clearly 
defined terms is critical when an option is concerned Christmas v Turkin. 716 P 2d 59, 60 (Ariz 
App 1986) 
For an option to be enforceable, the terms cannot be indefinite If any terms are left for future 
determination, the agreement is unenforceable Hi-Way Motor Co v Service Motor Co , 249 P 133, 
135 (Utah 1926)(holding that "[w]here the parties have left an essential part of the agreement for 
future determination the contract is not completed"), Christmas v Turkin. 716 P 2d at 60-61, 
Daley v Earven, 639 P 2d 372, 375 (Ariz App 1982), Miller v Pepper 638 P 2d 864, 866 (Haw 
18 
App 1982); Monahan v. Allen, ; . .• ; . -i.-.-. --, • >. Madison v. Marlai 
715 (Wj i >. 1980).,, 
In Christmas v Turkin, 716 P 2A ^ (\r\/ \rr 1 0 ^ +~ ^ t i o n to purchase provisioiI iii 
a icasL-:•.•.'« = * : . ;»; . : * • ' *] " "ie remaining terms 
of the option to pu^na^e sha '-e negotiated between Iman ' .<.ui Uuue? .md memorialized in 
writing" at a later date 1.; ,;. .-" . l e ^ i . , . . ' . : . / • i u cl ia.se 
pit ice. tl ie ecu u t found the option provision to be notiiing moie ma; -\ agreement to n lake an 
agreement" that could not be specifically enforced Id. at 60. The coiirt: iu.v^ ;; ., a o|-i.. . iot 
be er* '• .. ,_ nam, essential oi material 
terms ,md ih.t: a i,m; ,r ' > :-,'i a a - a ^uuei^r and essential turn o- element f s flitiire 
negotiation and settlement." Id (citing Daley. - i 
In the present case, the option provision is md^am^ «. *:~ terms and requires future 
negotiation. The provision states: 
At the Lime oi iiu. exj/jiaiiOi] v»: .uiiu leas^. _*." o oi icast puunenis Miad 
either be credited towards the down payment or towards the purchase 
price oi the above lefuenced home hach agent shali -biain a sepaiale 
appraisal an ? *• sales price shall be drt^^n^int i 
]
 (> . , ^ ., i lfcl. ".* • uasis added;. Clearly, one of the most 
essential term N the fan sales pi .ve wallet1 <• lutuu negotiatkv "'" e option .provision contains no 
metl.wv. ..-. .ieterminmg AIL -. . . 
provision is nothing more than an agreement to agree at a future date. 
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Furthermore, the trial court did not err by ruling that the option provision is unambiguous. 
Just because the provision was missing a term, and thus unenforceable, does not mean it is 
ambiguous. The provision unambiguously states that after appraisals are obtained, "a fair sales price 
shall be determined." No fair sales price has ever been determined by the parties. The trial court 
correctly ruled that the option provision was unambiguous and constituted an unenforceable 
"agreement to agree" on a material term at a later date. The court's ruling should not be disturbed. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting CTX's Motion to Strike Rukavina's 
Extrinsic Evidence. 
Rukavina claims, without any elaboration, that the trial court erred in granting CTX's motion 
to strike extrinsic evidence that Rukavina tried to inject into the case However, Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(c) gives a court the power to exclude matters outside the pleadings Rule 12(c) 
provides, "If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment " (emphasis added) 
If the relevant documents are clear and unambiguous on their face, a trial court need not look 
beyond the four corners of a document. John Deere Co. v. A & H Equip.. Inc.. 876 P.2d 880, 886 
n.10 (Utah App. 1994). When dealing with option contracts, extrinsic evidence is admissible only 
when the option contract is determined to be ambiguous. Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts, 768 
P.2d 976, 978 (Utah App. 1989) (finding option contract was ambiguous because printed and 
handwritten terms were incongruous). 
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As discussed above, ihe oplion pioviMon was cleai and unambiguous—the ti lal cour t's 
determination o? tin* >unic ua> c o n c t Because it was clear, extrinsic evidence could not be 
introduced to explain :iu contract's lenns.4 
Finally, even if extrinsic evidence was intioducej, in.-" evidence reveaK iiai fhe wtLe <-f the 
Property was not fixed in the option provision and instead i .-: u . , determine , 
Miii In M\ \(){V Irttn huiii IMII Ii^  ilia >< i iiimsi 1 In CTX's counsel remarks on the fact that WK wrm^ 
of the option aie h1es^ than detailed, ,)-:•* :IM: ris -pt"*•: pi.•• "••"•ion does rot say "wh Mh-a^. 
determi1..; i ..:ciiase price '• i X w e i c t u 
carry the financing for the propcrt> " <R. i ; ; . Moieo\ei, the >anu- etu*i ie\eai :h si t!u- -n lion w;h 
never pi.iperlvexercised Uv,i :°e no agreement a^  to a tend,, . \ *' M J \ . i e 
* - >n eel in bailing this soil of extii;i:>iv, ovidena ins ( ourt 
LOuiu, i n determined that ruling to be inapp^piiaie still afliim the trial court's ultimate deciMOi ::u.i 
the option provision was mil t ulouiMhli kisrd upun Kill ,r III.I ', hnhm1 lu pmpeilv exercise the 
alleged option provision. 
"Property Assistance uorp. uoes state generally that a contract could be deemed ambiguous when 
terms are missing from it. Property Assistance Corp., 768 P.2d at 977-78. That language does not 
-jpnu n- situations V J J as iiie case ai hand in which the missing terms are contemplated for 
<tct%---iuination in the fuiun In that situation, the line of cases discussed in section 11(a) above 
uovern and the optica . ar- • - : unenforceable. 
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in. 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY WHEN IT REFUSED TO CONSIDER 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE REGARDING THE OPTION PROVISION. 
In section C of his brief, Rukavina claims that the trial court erred by not accepting the 
affidavits he submitted He alleges that the lease agreement was not integrated, and thus parol 
evidence was needed to explain its terms There are two reasons why Rukavina's argument should 
be rejected First, this whole section is just another attempt to attack the trial court's determination 
that extrinsic evidence be barred CTX addressed Rukavina's argument on this point at length in 
section 11(B), supra 
Second, the lease does include an integration clause immediately preceding the option 
language at issue in this case Paragraph 15 states, "It is expressly stipulated that there are no terms 
of this agreement defferent [sic] from any of the proceding [sic] numbered paragraphs or in addition 
thereto, except the following " Lease, Addendum A to Appellee's Brief The subsequent language 
addresses the option to buy the Property Clearly, the only terms that the parties intended to be 
integrated into the lease are those in paragraph 15 concerning the option to purchase the Property 
The integration language specifically bars consideration of other extrinsic language except that 
actually contained in paragraph 15 
Paragraph 15 of the lease clearly contains integration language that would support a finding 
that the lease was an integrated contract Because parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the 
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unambigu*. ' ~ - , i IIK,-:, iiaiiK . ^scn^m, 7w7 P.2d oo33 665 11.1 (Utah 
1985), Rukavina's protestations on this poini must fail 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED COR R E C U ,Y WHEN I I ,1 EFl ISED ' 1 0 ENTERTAIN 
RUKAVINA'S IMPROPERLY FII -ED MOTION FOR PARTI AI SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR, SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT OF SE I I I ,EMENT AGREEMENT. 
• F led ei i oi by striking 1 us Mot ion foi Pai tial 
S u m m a n luriizmeni loi Mn-oific Enforcemi-m •*• v: i .cm</; t Agreement Rw!:avina addresses the 
mer i : > .; that mot ion ^ , m e 
motion. T h e trial coui t never reached the merits of*Rukavina K motion Inslt ul U m a m e u C I V s 
mot ion to strike the partial summary jndement motior. ivcauH* n vas i m p u g n . ! 
JM w , ' ' - ' ' ' i i - le motion loi pdiudi ^umiiidiy j udgment should he 
s t r icken because i: . a-* l,a^ I on new counK'u:iairw and affirmative defenses not included in 
Rukav ina' s or iginal A i is\* ei , ( U >ui itei claii i i, ai i. :! I I lit :1 I '"'ai ty Cot i ipla.ii it b It istead, the motion was 
b a s e c j o n n e w c j a i m s r a j s e ( j m Rukavina's proposed A mended Answer, Counterclaim, and Thii d 
Pai ty Complaint. The proposed amended answer I lad i lot been accepted t 
|i"itiiiiil l\ A l'"nL*n ma filed flu moduli In amend his answer ai id tl le n lotioi i foi partial summary 
judgment on the same day,,, ("Tl ia,l day was Decembei 9, 1,994, R 306-33 1 )„ There was no pei iding 
3In his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment KM hpeciiiL Lnlui cement oi Settlement Agreement, 
Rukavina seeks summary judgment on "Defendants' [sic] Fifth Affirmative Defense and Seventh 
Cause of Action contained in Defendants' [ sic J Amendeij \v-st/; ( ounieiciain. a\^) I'IMCI Paiiy 
Complaint." Motion w, I'-iuai S J I I D . J U i.-dimient 1* • "sH.'liic hnfotcemeni of Settlement 
Agreement .• ^ 'R : l:"n c 'Ui \ . » i i . - . .*.;is based on new claims -/ontaiiK,; i-iK T *^e 
p roposed amended a: :- ei ,„ 
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cause of action on which summary judgment could be granted The proposed counterclaims and 
affirmative defenses simply did not exist at that time 
The trial court's ruling rejecting the pleading is correct on two accounts First, the trial court 
denied Rukavina's motion to amend his answer, thereby obviating the motion for partial summary 
judgment 6 See Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Reinstate Judgment on the Pleadings or 
Judgment on the Pleadings and Denying Defendant's Motion for Leave, paragraphs 8-9 (R 549) 
Second, by filing the motion for partial summary judgment before the trial court had ruled on his 
motion to amend the answer, Rukavina did not comply with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13(e) and 
15(a), which require leave of court to file a new counterclaim or pleading Although he did seek 
leave of court, he did not receive leave at all, much less before the partial summary judgment motion 
was filed Allowing Rukavina to proceed on the summary judgment motion in this fashion would be 
in direct contravention to Rules 13(e) and 15(a), and would make a mockery of the court and the 
Rules of Civil Procedure 
Before this Court, Rukavina attempts to argue the merits of his summary judgment motion 
This is both puzzling and inappropriate given the trial court's ruling CTX respectfully requests that 
the Court affirm the trial court's determination striking Rukavina's summary judgment motion 
6CTX will address the legitimacy of the trial court's ruling denying Rukavina's motion to amend the 
Answer in section VI, infra 
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^ ' 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING REINS I A I ING I HE 
APRTT 20, 1993, JUDGMENT WAS PROPER. 
After granting CI X s riv h^ toi luctenicr -•' !he pleading? ~r April .: :w- ,,.: . ... . ^i 
temporarily vacated - * - - ^ o i b j I ne uiai ^oun vacated 
l j i e . . ..,,..,. pursuant to LiaL . r<iH: Annotated sector- "•• 1 Oa- \ M.-.\ i i uhkh ,»iohibits unregistered 
foreign /orpnrntion0 ^orr rorvnMiuing a proceeding n • t 
c ; < ~. * • - l iah, and thus was noi iii compha*uv w it:. JC.LIO!. M* j w\ \ N*'J( I i 
The in*:! court •. oidei \<t.:atiin; the judgment reserved the issue of whether, as a maiit: *• e 
p . , - , , , y i i c : • • o J 0 4 - 3 0 5 ) . On February 27, 
1995, me uiai ^ou uaistaicd the ludumem ;•»; * ' \ r . ' ^ , . '^ CTX's Motion to Reinstate 
t . J
 p+ ^rj p0 f i.|(}grnenf o n _ a .^ aumL::- - '.'.">iate 
i-.i * :~* " Ru^avina now challenges the propriety ,)! !:K :;..i! .>u,: sailing. 
Rukavina claims that the trial court.'s ruling reinstating ;,.v iua^n.ej. -
applica.NS :< ' l lah law. Rukavina cite^ to ca^es dealinui 
with the retroactive applicatioi i of an amended statute. See Kofoed v. Industrial ComirTn b ,. i 
484, 480 (Utah App I,L*'*• 4 ((discussing uliutti hu a|i|i|jui(n n\ nl , 111m lulment to worker s' 
recusation statute). Rukavina's argument is completer ufl ;^m; a;,.: u*\ tih ^applicable v- *l~.e 
case at hand.,. This is obviously not. a case ir- \v:.„, • .u • - a: -• . 
lelmai'tivcly. 
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In reinstating the judgment, the trial court was merely complying with the existing mandate 
in section 16-10a-1502(3), which provides 
A court may stay a proceeding commenced by a foreign corporation, its 
successor, or assignee until it determines whether the foreign corporation, 
its successor or assignee is required to file an application for authority to 
transact business If it so determines, the court may further stay the 
proceeding until the required application for authority to transact business 
has been filed by the division 
That section authorizes a court to stay an action while the foreign corporation files the proper 
application Once the corporation has done so, the action may proceed 
Here, CTX filed the required application after realizing that it was not authorized to transact 
business in Utah CTX Properties' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment and 
Dismiss Complaint, p 2 (R 245) Once the required application was filed, the action could proceed 
Thus, the trial court was correct in reinstating the judgment 
Also, the trial court's Order Vacating the Judgment stated that it was reserving the issue of 
whether the judgment previously entered in favor of CTX was void or voidable By reinstating the 
judgment, the trial court necessarily determined that it was voidable only This determination is 
supported by Utah case law Tooele Meat & Storage Co v Fite Candy Co . 168 P 427, 429 (Utah 
1917)(refusing to set aside a judgment in favor of unregistered corporation and ruling that "a 
judgment in an action in which the plaintiff did not have the legal capacity to sue or to prosecute the 
same is not void") Rukavina's argument on this point totally misses the boat This is clearly not a 
case of retroactive application of a statute, and Rukavina wastes the Court's time in framing it as 
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such,,, I lie trial unnl did tint cm vlirri ii icinsiaU'd die |iiih:»iiini! pin vnanl to Utah Code Ann. section 
16-10a-1502(3). 
THE TRIAL COURT 1)11) NOT ABUSE ITS D1SCRE1ION Will- \ II l)I.Mi-:i) 
RUKAVINA'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS ANSWER. COUNTER* I AIM, AND 
THIRD-PARTY COMP1 \V-
• Pi i ikavii :t,a argi les tl lat tl: le ti ial coi u t abi ised its disc: - on wncn it did not permit Rukavma to 
amend his Answer, Cuintercla !• and Third-Party Complaint. The facts in this case reveal, that the 
trial court was well .-,•,,.- . disci etioi* -::a 1 
I • - i vvneri, on Februdi} i.7, r / ^ , n denied Kukav ma ira\ : i.» ?• • die amended pleading 
Utah courts may grant a motion to amend a pleading on * n .^ ; . :ie moving p;*. . s 
justified a„:i: \y i easons foi delay, and tl: le respoi " M- ra i : \ i * n- *• pi ejuuiced Mountain America Credit 
Union v. McClellam 854 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah App. 1.993) As set forth below, Riikavina's motion 
to amend fails i . . .,oc uiu-zwiio. 
Rukavina filed his motion toi *euve to file the proposed ai nended answei on December 9, 
1,994, over two years after he filed his original answer on 1;, a i m ;^ ~ : wv_ • s 
* "• - • •: -i . ..a* due, ana a 5odia uiicc iiioiuhb ben a (• Hie scheduled 
March 28, iu^5 trial dat< i.-. >(n» ueneralK. a motior to i^-rnd is considered maimely where 
ii i^  >\my.i • . • iiic die amended 
pleading at an earlier date o- vha*-c u- . i ' . ^ ^ . , ,\ i, awaae ol die taci^ underKmL* the proposed 
amendment long befr-o ; « -a- * npjp \ \ augnr. • ). 
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1987)(afFirming denial of motion to amend answer and counterclaim filed thirteen months after 
original answer). 
Here, the motion was filed (1) more than two years after the original answer, (2) late in the 
course of the litigation, and (3) only three months prior to trial The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by determining that a motion seeking to add myriad new claims at that late juncture was 
untimely. 
Next, the motion was properly denied because Rukavina provided no adequate justification 
for the delay in filing the proposed amended answer In his motion to amend, Rukavina merely 
asserted, without elaboration, that 'justice requires" the granting of his motion (R 310) That is 
not sufficient The new claims that Rukavina attempted to inject arise out of the same facts contained 
in the complaint and answer No allegation of newly discovered facts or other such justification was 
made in Rukavina's motion to amend or has been made in his brief on appeal No adequate reason 
for the delay exists 
Finally, the facts reveal that CTX would have been prejudiced if the amended answer with 
several new counterclaims and affirmative defenses was filed The motion deadline expired on the 
day Rukavina filed his motion to amend, and trial was only three months away CTX, at great 
expense and effort, had prepared its case and conducted discovery with the pending claims and 
scheduling deadline in mind 
Forcing CTX to answer to additional claims that should have been brought earlier would have 
forced CTX to adopt a whole new defensive strategy late in the course of litigation CTX would have 
had to conduct additional discovery, and the existing discovery and motion cutoff dates and the trial 
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datewouiu !ia'»^  ;..:on .^op.n-.iL. * '.i • in-;- :! ".: ; r* •.••-• * *• *••• ' i.onwas 
granted^ the trial court was well within its discretion whei i it denied the same. 
THE TRIAL COl IRT CORRECTL\ -. * y\\^<VU III- f HTR7>-P-\RTY 
COMPLAINT FII ,ED AGAINST BARNEY AND WRIGHT FOR FAILURE 
COMPLY WITH UTAH PUT F OF n v n PROCEDURE 4(b). 
Rukrivmit\ final i-hnn >n appeal is that the ti ial coui t ei i ed by dismissing the third-party 
complain: to? U,I IH- : > uunr - ^(r * TKd: Pii! ^rC:vil Procedure 4(b) • M.H* pi*-. -k\ \\ui: 
servu- . t ,1 c('m| ..:.
 4 ; *. , -j unie ioi good 
cause sLoVvh. Ltai;K. ~*. ±' . : !: further provides that "[i]f the summons and ^omria^- an. no' 
timeh -cnv^ *hr ncti°r shnP o dismissed, without prejudice on applkalion \l <in\ pail1, i ii| . n 
emphasis added; 1 aiiue to timely serve the complaint mandates 
dismissal See Dennett v Powers, 5>6 P ".; 11 ^ \^6 fTTt,ih ]0?c>t (aflirmmu ;oai o^., > nsm^sal 
O f c o m p l a i n l Inn I | i l | i n I n , u i, i\ i l l i | i i I | n r 41 1i|Mi I 
Rukavina endeavors to circumvent the clear mandate of Rule 4(b) by claiming that Barney 
accepted service of the third-party complaint against her l l o n o n Baiiie\ did not ,u cept sen ire 
*• ' v^-iou—in iact, she accepted service on Jaixaai) ib, 19u>, o\u mo \ean after the 
third-part\ compiaim ^a.s filed (R. 423-424) Accepting service over two vea^ L;U-. .'.'O :i->t 
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Additionally, the trial court dismissed the third-party complaint without prejudice Rukavina 
was free to refile it, but chose not to The trial court did not err by dismissing the third-party 
complaint without prejudice 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court acted appropriately when it enforced the settlement agreement entered into by 
the parties in their letters dated March 14 and 16, 1995 The agreement was clear and unambiguous, 
and Rukavina's excuse for nonperformance under the agreement is unsubstantial The trial court did 
not err when it determined that CTX could waive its right to a global settlement, CTX was the one 
seeking a global settlement, and it therefore had the right to waive that demand 
Even if the Court determines that enforcement of the settlement agreement was inappropriate, 
it can still affirm the trial court's ruling granting judgment on the pleadings In granting CTX's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court correctly ruled that the option provision in the 
lease was unambiguous and unenforceable The purchase price of the Property was to be determined 
in the future, and option contracts with terms performable in the future are unenforceable The trial 
court did not err when it denied Rukavina's attempt to introduce extrinsic evidence to vary the terms 
of the option provision The provision is clear and unambiguous on its face and needs no extrinsic 
evidence to explain its terms The option provision was integrated and extrinsic evidence cannot be 
introduced to vary the terms of an integrated contract 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Rukavina's motion to amend his 
Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint The proposed amended answer was untimely, no 
adequate reason for delay was provided and CTX would have been prejudiced by its introduction 
30 
Ruka\ir.t: s S\ \ : * - N-•••:•••* •?cement was 
properly stricken by the trial court. ' Tlie mci:j". \^ nased ^n claims contained onK if- Ruka\inaV 
proposed amended answer, which, was never C U ^ L * . - . . . ! . 
si n i n i lai y ji idgi i lei it coi ll :! be gi ai ited. 
The trial court's ailing reinstating the April 20,, 1993, judgment was proper,. The ti lal. court 
correctl) : ,: • .* - .. i . ^ >j in reinstating the 
judgment. 
. The trial court correctu dismiss*.,: *.. . • IMVI^ .M -, •• • •• , 
B-*! • - iiure to comply witl i Utah K. c iv . *\ ;v v / . Barney was not served with a 
summons and \\u c o m p r i n t foi ovei two years,,, well beyond, th^ 1 0 ° dav •= ; .i. • -,., ;.i ). 
%
 • !- •* ,i|\ *i\,uests that the 
Court bung this cast-?.-
 ; close hv affirming Un tnai , ^u i : - wiu; _ : t \ e r \ i e g a i d 
D A T E D this / ^ . iU\ •« ... ^ 6 
M O X L E Y , JONES & C A M P B E I I 
Paul T. Moxley 
J • • • < _ _ 
7 7 
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ADDENDUM 
L E A S E 
THIS LEASE entered into this 1st day of July 19 87 , 
between CTX PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, hereinafter called Agent and 
Andv Rukavina * hereinafter called tenant. 
Agent does hereby lease and rent unto tenant, and tenant does 
hereby take as tenant under Agent, the dwelling accommodations 
situated ati 5648 So. Maiic Isle Lane County of Salt LRVA , 
State of Utah, to be used by tenant as a lawful private dwelling. 
Said accommodations are rented for occupancy of
 Qne adult (s) 
and/or ~°~ children- Said lease amount shall be $ **500»00»« 
per month, paid in full or in advance on the first day of each month. 
Occupancy shall be for said term ofi 
1. Month to month tenancy: (initial), 
2. Annual lease from the ^st # day of .inly 19 RJ 
to the 1st day of July . « ^ Q? 
IN CONSIDERATION whereof, and of the covenants hereafter expressed, 
it is covenanted and agreed as followsi 
1. Tenant agrees to pay to Agent, CTX property Management, 
in full or in advance on the first day of each month, at 
the office of Agent located at 323 So. 600 East SLC, UT. 
84102. Said amount shall be due and payable on the first day 
of each month. 
(a) A cleaning deposit in the amount of §
 n/fl 
shall be paid in full and in advance by tenant and held 
by Agent to be refunded only if premises are left in 
accordance with this lease. 
(b) The cleaning deposit is not to be withheld from any 
rent monies due and payable to CTX Property Management. 
(c) Deposit will be refunded, wholly or partially, only 
after the inspection of said premises by the propety manager 
After tenant has vacated. 
2 
Amount refund will soley depend on the descretion of the property 
roonager*8 judgment. 
(d) Transfer of Utilitiesi Tenant has no longer than 72 Hrs. 
to transfer utilities from CTX Property Management into the 
name of the tenant. AFTER THE 72 HOUR GRACE PERIOD HAS ELAPSED 
CTX PROPERTY MANAGEMENT SHALL CALL THE PLUBLIC UTILITIES . 
AND HAVE SERVICES SHUT OFF if tenant has not transfered 
utilities into the name of tenant. 
(e) It is mutually agreed upon, that after thirty (30) 
days delinquent I (tenant) wave all rights to possession 
of said premises. 
(f) It is futher agreed that any personal belongings may 
be removed by the spid Agent who is fully authorized by 
power of Attorney by property Agent. 
2. Tenant shall not permit any unlawful or immoral practice 
to be committed on the premises; nor shall he/she permit 
them to .be used as a boarding or lodging house, for rooming 
or school purposes, nor for any purpose which will increase 
insurance rates; nor shall he/she permit to be kept or used 
inflammable fluids or explosives without consent of Agent 
nor permit them to be used for any purpose which will injure 
the reputation of the building or which will disturb the 
tenants of the building or the inhabitants of the neighborhood 
3. Tenant has examined the premisses and is satisfied with the 
the physical condition and his/her taking possession is 
conclusibal evidence of receipt of them in good order and 
repair, and the tenant agrees to keep said premises in a 
clean and satisfactory condition, and upon termination of 
this tenancy, will leave said premises, equipment and 
furnishings in as good condition as when entered upon, except 
for reasonable wear and tear, in the event of damage or injury 
3 
to said premises, except as otherwise provided herein, said 
tenant shall pay for all such damages. Tenant shall be 
responsible for all broken glass or damages to screens and 
storm doors during tenancy. Cleaning in excess of this 
covenant will be held from deposit. ALL repairs made by 
tenant must be cleared through CTX# with minor repairs 
remaining the responsibility of the tenant. 
4. Tenant agrees to pay all electric power'and lights, gas, 
water and telephone charges; and for laundering of curtains, 
minor plumbing, ( sujh as drain cleaning, etc.), cleaning 
of drapes, carpets, cleaning of furnace filters, during 
tenanacy and when vacating said dwelling.tenant also agrees 
to pay cleaning said premises at the rate of $20.00 per 
hour to be withheld from original cleaning deposit. (I: 
5. Tenant shall not have the right or power to sublet the 
premises or any part thereof, or the transfer or assign 
this lease without the written consent of Agent; nor shall 
he/she offer any portion of premises for a sublease by 
placing on the same any "to rent" "furnished room", "rooms 
to let" or similar sign or notice, without the consent in 
writing from Agent. 
6. It is expressly agreed and understood by the Agent and 
tenant that the Agent shall not be liable for any damage 
or injury by water which may be sustained by the tenant or 
other person or for any damage or injury resulting from 
carelessness, negligence or improper conduct on the part 
of any other tenant or agents or employees. 
7. Furthermore, it is soley at the descretion of each tenant 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is mutually understood and agreed that the Agent and his 
agents shall have access to the leased premises at all reasonable 
times to inspect and protect the same, to show the same to 
prospective purchaser, tenant, or mortgage, and to make any 
repairs. 
Tenant agrees not to keep or maintain a dog, cat, or any other 
animal or pet on the leaded premises without the written 
consent of the Agent. Any violation of this covenant will 
result in forfeiture of security deposit and termination of 
lease. 
Tenant shall comply with all the reasonable rules and regulations 
now in force by Agent, and posted in or about the premises, or 
otherwise brought to the notice of tenant, both regaurd to the 
building as a whole and as to the premises herein leased. 
In the event the leased premeises are furnished with furniture 
of the Agent, an inventory of the furniture shall be attached 
hereto and made a part thereof, and it is hereby agreed that 
all furnishings are received in good condition, unless otherwise 
expressly stated, and the tenant further agrees to return the 
same at the expiration hereof in like condition reasonable 
wear and tear expected. 
It is expressly stipulated that there are no terms of this 
agreement defferent from any of the proceding numbered 
paragraphs or in addition thereto, except the following! 
At the time of the exnir.ition of said 1^**^ 70% of 1**KP> 
payments shall either be credited towards the down payment or 
towards the purchase price of the abovft r~*f*r*nn*f\ hnm**_ R*r^ h 
agent shall obtain a separate appraisal and at that time a 
fair sales price shall be determined. 
6 
16. If lease is terminated for any reason other than job transfer 
out of state, deposit will be forfeited. 
17. Any repairs made without consent of Agent, will be charged to 
tenant, (more specifictiily, see paragraph #3). 
18. Tenant shall not at any time withhold rent monies without prior 
written approval from CTX Management. Failure to obtain written 
approval for any improvements shall result in tenants sole 
responsibility for payment of expenditure. 
19. No part of security deposit can be used as rent. 
This deposit is to protect the Owner against cleaning and damage. 
20. The tenant and Agent each agree that should tenant default in 
any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the 
tenant shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which may arise from enforcing this agreement, 
or in obtaining possession of the premises by statutes of the 
State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
Signed in the presence of: 
WITNESS DATE 
AGENTi 
CTX PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
